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This paper employs Social Identity Theory to investigate the impact of auditor expertise and jurors’ 
identification with auditors on jurors’ perceptions of auditor negligence. Consistent with expectations, 
jurors who identified more strongly with auditors (strong identifiers) levied more lenient negligence 
judgments to auditors than weak identifiers. These findings suggest that lay jurors demonstrate the ability 
to empathize with auditors. However, the significant interaction between jurors’ social identities and the 
firm’s level of expertise suggests that the effects of jurors’ identities on negligence verdicts may be 
constrained by firm characteristics.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) proposes that individuals have a positive image of themselves, which 
may result in a more favourable judgment of others who they consider similar. Attempts to understand 
juror biases using SIT have not been undertaken until recently, when Reffett et al. (2012) anecdotally 
suggested that lay jurors’ biases may be explained by SIT. The present study differs from Reffett et al. 
(2012), as this study’s objective is to empirically examine whether the strength of jurors’ identification 
with auditors impacts their perceptions of auditor negligence by operationalizing SIT. 
This study is motivated by the scarcity with which juror bias is examined in auditing research. 
Outside of Kadous’ (2001) use of the “affect-as-information” theory and Reffett et al.’s (2012) anecdotal 
attribution of juror behaviour to SIT, research that operationalizes psychology theories is needed to 
explain juror behaviour. Reffett et al. (2012) suspect that lay jurors are more likely to express empathy 
towards auditors, since their study assumes that lay jurors’ lack of auditing experience makes them unfit 
to empathize with auditors. However, it is unknown whether lay jurors are unable to identify with auditors 
solely because they do not have audit experience. Hence, it is an empirical question as to whether the 
strength of jurors’ identification allows them to empathize with auditors, thereby creating more “accurate 
and favourable outcomes” for auditors in negligence cases. This paper attempts to accomplish this task. 
Mock jurors were recruited from undergraduate students at a public university in the United States as a 
proxy for jurors.1 To understand whether the strength of jurors’ identification with auditors influences 
their assessments of auditor negligence, a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment was adapted from Thornton 
and Shaub (2014). The case consists of an auditor who was involved in a negligence lawsuit following the 
audit of a client to whom aggressive tax services (ATS) was provided. Two independent variables were 
manipulated. Juror identification was manipulated between strong and weak identifiers. These levels were
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collected from participants via Mael and Ashforth’s Organizational Identification Scale and analysed to 
stratify the sample. One other independent variable, industry expertise, was manipulated based on the 
firm capturing thirty-percent of the market share, a threshold that was used in prior research (McGuire et 
al., 2012; Neal and Riley, 2004). This variable was included to account for the impact of expertise, which 
has been found to reduce the likelihood that an auditor would succumb to client pressure when a close-
client relationship exists (Bamber and Iyer, 2007).  
Consistent with expectations, the results of this study indicate that the strength of jurors’ 
identification with auditors significantly (as a main effect variable) impacts their perceptions of auditor 
independence, objectivity, and auditor negligence. These findings suggest that lay jurors demonstrate the 
ability to empathize with auditors, as evidenced by strong identifiers’ assignment of lower negligence 
verdicts to auditors than weak identifiers. This study also proposed a hypothesis that examined jurors’ 
identification with auditors and expertise as main effects variables as well as the interaction between these 
variables. The significant interaction term indicates that while juror identification is a major factor in the 
assignment of liability, their negligence verdicts also depend on other important factors such as an 
auditors’ expertise. Collectively, these results suggest that the strength of jurors’ identification with 
auditors impacts their negligence verdicts, but the effect may be constrained by certain auditor 
characteristics. 
The findings from this study have implications for research and practice. From a research perspective, 
this study is the first to employ the Social Identity Theory to examine the role juror bias in auditor 
negligence cases. This contribution advances the work of Reffett et al. (2012), who interpret lay 
evaluators’ judgments in light of SIT, but do not operationalize the theory in their analysis. The current 
study overcomes this limitation by adapting Mael and Ashforth’s Organizational Identification Scale to 
measure the strength of jurors’ identification with auditors, and including this measurement as an 
independent variable. This leads to the recognition of a subset of jurors whose judgments may be 
unknowingly have a predetermined bias that may be identified during the juror selection process. Through 
this identification process, juror panels may be likely to reflect panels of peers who are able to express 
empathy with respect to their evaluations of auditor negligence.  
From a legal standpoint, Brandon and Mueller (2006) propose that jurors’ perceptions – not reality – 
may ultimately determine an auditor’s fate in court. Bauer (2015) suggests that heightening the salience of 
an attribute may increase a desired result (i.e. heightening professional salience increases professional 
scepticism). The findings that the strength of juror identification impacts negligence verdicts may be 
instrumental to attorneys in their decision as to whether to take a case to trial or to settle out of court. 
The next section reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses examined in the study. The third 
section describes the study’s research method. The fourth section provides the results, followed by the 
conclusion and opportunities for future research in the fifth section. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Auditor independence is an essential element of audit quality and a requirement for registered public 
accounting firms (PCAOB, 2004). The SEC asserts that both independence “in fact” and “in appearance” 
are equally important (SEC, 2001). The SEC declares auditor independence to be impaired if the 
provision of nonaudit services “(a) creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant and the 
audit client, (b) places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work, (c) results in the 
accountant acting as management or an employee of the audit client, or (d) places the accountant in a 
position of being an advocate for the audit client” (SEC, 2001). Several survey-based research studies 
find independence to be impaired when auditors provide audit and nonaudit services to an audit client 
(Briloff, 1966; Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1981; Shockley, 1981; Pany and Reckers, 1988).2  Some experimental 
research supports these findings (Lowe and Pany, 1996; Mishra et al., 2005), while others do not 
(McKinley et al., 1985; Pany and Reckers, 1987). 
Brandon and Mueller (2006, p. 3) highlight the importance of juror-based research, as they state that 
jurors’ perceptions of auditor independence are likely to determine an auditor’s fate in court. The present 
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study extends their line of research to investigate whether one psychological aspect – jurors’ identification 
with auditors –impairs their perceptions of auditor independence when auditors are prohibited from 
providing ATS to their audit clients. 
 
Aggressive Tax Services 
The AICPA indicates that tax professionals of accounting firms who provide tax services to their 
audit clients “become advocates [for their clients] that develop favourable tax positions that fall within the 
boundaries of the tax law (AICPA, 2000).” Accounting regulators suggest that the provision of ATS 
“place the auditor in a position inconsistent with the necessary objectivity” (SEC, 2001). Accordingly, the 
SEC (2006) and the PCAOB (2005) declare registered public accounting firms to be non-independent if 
they engage in the marketing, planning, or expressing of an opinion on aggressive tax positions for their 
audit clients.3  
Research suggests that the proscription of these services was a reaction to accounting scandals at the 
turn of the century rather than the result of empirical evidence that ATS impair independence (Thornton 
and Shaub, 2014; Sloan, 2005). Thornton and Schaub (2014) report that jurors deem auditor 
independence to be impaired by the joint provision of audit and ATS. The goal of the present study is not 
to investigate whether ATS services impair perceptions of auditor independence, but to investigate 
whether perceptions of independence may be skewed by jurors’ social identities. The Social Identity 
Theory is employed to accomplish this task. 
 
Social Identity Hypothesis 
The Social Identity Theory is a cognitive-based theory that is concerned with when and why 
individuals identify with and/or adopt the shared attitudes and behaviours of certain groups (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1985). An individual’s social identity represents their sense of who they are based on their group 
membership(s). The four components in the development of a social identity are: (1) categorization, (2) 
identification, (3) comparison, and (4) psychological distinctiveness. This study is concerned with the 
elements of categorization (which addresses how individuals categorize themselves) and comparison 
(which addresses an individual’s favourable bias towards one group over another). The process of 
developing a social identity begins with an individual defining oneself, and then aligning themselves with 
groups where people in the group are perceived by the individual to be similar to that individual. While it 
is possible for individuals experiencing a social identity crisis to possess multiple distinct identities, the 
most prevalent identity usually manifests itself.   
Much research has explored the use of SIT to understand service organizations, employees and 
auditors. Social identity problems are prevalent in service organizations and knowledge-intensive 
organizations (Alvesson, 2000). Social psychology and organizational behavioural research find that 
social identity problems may significantly affect employees’ attitudes and behaviours (Hogg and Terry, 
2000; Ellemers et al., 2002; Riketta, 2005). Psychology literature suggests that auditors who feel a strong 
social identity with their client are more likely to internalize the client’s accounting and business norms, 
which may affect how the auditor makes accounting decisions (Lembke and Wilson, 1998).  
Despite the application of SIT in auditing literature, this theory has not been employed to investigate 
whether jurors’ identification with auditors impacts their verdicts in auditor independence cases. Two 
competing lines of reasoning may be advanced with respect to this matter. Arguably, one of the most sinister 
threats to a juror’s proper rendering of an unfavourable negligence verdict in an audit independence case 
may arise when jurors strongly identify with auditors. Ingriselli (2015, p. 1697) suggests that the core of 
the social identity theory is that individuals desire to have a positive image of themselves, and are willing 
to be more lenient when judging those they consider to be similar to them. By doing so, this promotes 
favourable perceptions of individuals’ social groups, which may increase individuals’ self-esteem. 
Following this logic, this study proposes that jurors who strongly identify with auditors may judge 
auditors less harshly than jurors who do not identify with auditors. The following hypothesis examines 
this theory: 
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H1a: Strong identifiers will perceive auditors to be more independent than weak identifiers 
H1b: Strong identifiers will perceive auditors to be more objective than weak identifiers 
H1c: Strong identifiers will perceive auditors to be less negligent than weak identifiers 
 
Industry Expertise Hypothesis 
An alternative line of reasoning suggests that auditor-identifying jurors who believe that an auditor’s 
industry expertise insulates the auditor from factually impairing their independence may fail to find expert 
auditors negligent when providing nonaudit services to clients. Over time, accounting firms develop their 
expertise by training, by auditing clients in the same industry (Ferguson et al., 2003) and by sharing 
knowledge and experience across clients. Wilson (2015b) posits that auditors’ concerns about their 
reputation for quality is a financial incentive which deters them from compromising their objectivity 
during an audit. However, the literature is mixed as to whether a firm’s reputation as an industry expert 
will motivate them to provide a high quality audit.  
Psychology research predicts that more experienced decision makers have highly-developed 
knowledge structures that allow them to focus on evidence that is relevant to the situation at hand (Patel 
and Groen, 1986; Lesgold et al., 1988). Likewise, expert auditors have incentives to provide high quality 
audit services (Chin and Chi, 2009; Eichenseher and Danos, 1981). Expert auditors are also associated 
with higher quality disclosures (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004), exhibit a higher degree of compliance with 
audit standards (O’Keefe et al., 1994), and protect their reputations to reduce the occurrences of frivolous 
lawsuits (Datar and Alles, 1999). Research also indicates that expertise is associated with higher audit 
quality (Reichelt and Wang, 2010) and the reduced likelihood to succumb to client pressure (Bamber and 
Iyer, 2007). Given these findings, conventional wisdom suggests that in the absence of regulations 
prohibiting auditors’ provision of these services, expert firms’ audit quality and objectivity may not be 
impaired during the audit. 
However, this prediction is not without tension. Auditing research does not find a direct relationship 
between expertise and financial reporting reliability (Wilson, 2015a; DeZoort et al., 2012; Sainty et al., 
2002). Likewise, psychology research also indicates that less experienced auditors possess a “surface level” 
understanding of domain-specific knowledge (Frederick and Libby, 1986; Bedard and Biggs, 1991), which 
tends to result in the generation of fewer alternative hypotheses and explanations regarding evidence 
collected during the engagement. Hence, it is an empirical question as to whether industry expertise will 
convince jurors that expert firms’ independence and objectivity will not be compromised by providing 
ATS to an audit client.  
When concurrently considering expertise and jurors’ level of identification with auditors, another 
question that arises is whether the significance of jurors’ identification would be greatest among the levels of 
the firm’s expertise, or equally significant under each condition. That is, it is unknown whether jurors’ 
identification is a main effect or an interaction effect. The following hypothesis addresses this line of 
reasoning: 
H2: In cases of alleged auditor negligence, juror identification will significantly impact jurors’ 
perceptions of the auditor’s negligence when auditing and providing ATS to the client across 
levels of the firm’s expertise. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
Undergraduate student participants were recruited from undergraduate classes at a public university in 
the United States as a proxy for jurors. The use of college undergraduates as a proxy for jurors is 
consistent with prior auditing research (Reffett et al., 2012; Wilson, 2015b; Brandon and Mueller, 2006; 
Kadous, 2000), which fails to find consistent differences between students and mock jurors (Zickafoose 
and Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein, 1999).  
A total of 120 responses were collected. Of these, 87 usable responses were obtained (Table 1, Panel 
A). Thirty-two responses were removed due to a failed response to the manipulation check question. One 
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response was not recorded, as the student opted not to complete the study. On average, participants were 
28.7 years of age, which indicates a high percentage of non-traditional students, and speaks to the 
maturity of the students participating in the study. Approximately 31.8 percent of the participants 
indicated that have owned stock. Regarding their political preferences, 17.2 percent indicated that they 
were liberal, while 57.5 percent indicated that they were conservative. Finally, nearly 70.5 percent of 
participants’ indicated that they had taken three or fewer political science classes.  
 
TABLE 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW 
Panel A: Jurors’ Demographics  
Age (years) 28.7 
Female (percentage) 61.4 
Participants Who Have Owned Stock (percentage) 31.8 
Political Preference  (percentage)  
   Liberal 17.2 
   Conservative 57.5 
Percentage Who Have Taken Three or Fewer Political Science Classes  70.5 
Approximate Level of Income (percentage)*  
  Less than $60,000 75.6 
  More than $60,000 10.4 
  No Answer Provided 14.0 
______________________________  
*Differences in 100% due to rounding  
  
Panel B: Participant Distribution  
Experimental Manipulation 
Random 
Distribution 
Usable Responses  
(Passed Manipulation Check) 
Weak Auditor Identification * High Expertise 30 24 
Weak Auditor Identification * Low Expertise 30 22 
Strong Auditor Identification * High Expertise 30 22 
Strong Auditor Identification * Low Expertise 30 19 
         Usable Responses  87 
 
 
 Independent Variable of Interest and Research Task  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental case studies through Qualtrics®, 
the online platform used to administer the study.4  In the following sections, “Task One” provides an 
overview of participants’ first task, which was undertaken to acquire how strongly participants identified 
with auditors. “Task Two” discusses the construction of the experiment, the manipulation check and the 
collection of demographic data. 
 
Task One (Juror Social Identity)  
The first task was to complete Mael and Ashforth’s Organizational Identification Scale in order to 
collect information regarding participants’ level of identification with auditors (Mael and Ashforth, 1992). 
Five questions from the scale were modified to acquire participants’ level of identification with auditors. 
Following each question, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each question 
on a 5-point Likert scale anchored at 1 = Completely Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. During the 
research analysis phase, participants’ responses were averaged together. Participants whose average 
scores were between “4” and “5” were identified in the analysis as “Strong Identifiers”; all others were 
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identified as “Weak Identifiers.” As a result of this process, participants were post-experimentally 
assigned to the main variable of interest: juror identification. 
 
Task Two 
Following the completion of the Organizational Identification Scale, participants were prompted in 
Qualtrics® to proceed to the next section (the experiment). The experiment was adapted from prior 
research (Thornton and Shaub, 2014; Kadous, 2000). The experiment was constructed using an audit 
litigation case, since research finds that legal action is most likely to be taken against an auditor if the 
client experiences bankruptcy (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Palmrose, 1987). In addition, the motivation 
for grafting an alleged audit failure in the case was inspired by Casterella et al. (2009, p. 716), who 
suggest that a malpractice claim is a reasonable proxy for audit failure. 
The experiment involved the plaintiff (Johnson, Ltd.) who relied on Western Rock and Gravel's 
financial statements to extend a loan to the client. The plaintiff (Johnson, Ltd.) alleges that Smith & 
Adams CPA Firm failed to uncover management fraud during their audit of the client, and Johnson 
suffered severe losses by relying on these audited financial statements to extend a loan to the client. The 
defendant (Smith & Adams CPA) argues that the financial statement audit was performed in conformity 
with the generally accepted auditing standards which were in place at the time of the audit. After reading 
the case, participants were asked to complete a post-experimental questionnaire. This questionnaire 
collected participants’ perceptions of the firm’s independence, objectivity and their assessments of 
negligence to the firm following the alleged audit failure. 
Using Qualtrics®, participants were not allowed to access the case again after completion of the 
experimental questions. Following the completion of the post-experimental questions, participants were 
asked to complete a manipulation check on a separate screen to ensure that they understood the case. 
Finally, participants’ demographic information was collected. 
 
Expertise Manipulation 
In addition to the tension in the literature centred on auditor expertise, this variable is manipulated in 
this study to reduce the salience of the study’s focus on juror identity, thereby decreasing the likelihood of 
demand effects amongst the participants. The present study posits that industry expert firms will be 
perceived as being less negligent in auditor liability cases. In order to achieve this manipulation, the study 
adopts McGuire et al.’s (2012) methodology to operationalize industry expertise by designating industry 
expert firms as those whose market share exceeds 30 percent. The study manipulates industry experts as 
firms that “audit over 75% of the market share.” Non-industry experts are designated as auditing 25% of 
the market share.  
 
Dependent Measures 
Participants’ perceptions of the following three dependent measures were collected in the study: 
auditor independence, objectivity and auditor negligence. Participants were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with each dependent measure by providing both a dichotomous response (yes, no) and a five-
point confidence-in-answer assessment. These responses were combined to create a 10-point agreement 
rating scale, anchored at 1 = Not Confident at All and 10 = Completely Confident. The combined 
confidence-in-answer measure is consistent with prior research, and provides a more predictive measure 
than a single dichotomous response (Wilson 2017, Brandon and Mueller, 2006). An overview of the 
dependent variables is as follows. 
 
Independence (Appearance) 
Participants were presented with a question to measure their perceptions of auditor independence 
when the firm provided audit and ATS to their audit clients, which was adapted from prior research 
(Wilson, 2015a; DeZoort et al., 2012). To gather their perceptions of this measure, the participants were 
asked to respond to the following statement: “Smith & Adams, CPAs would have a conflict of interest 
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during the audit if they were to provide the client with tax advice that would legally help the client 
lower their income taxes.” 
 
Objectivity 
Similar to the construction of the independence question, a question which measured participants’ 
perceptions of auditor objectivity during the audit was adapted from prior research (Wilson, 2015a; 
DeZoort et al., 2012). The following question was presented to participants to obtain this information: 
“Smith & Adams’ audit team was not objective when auditing Western.” 
 
Negligence 
In order for a plaintiff to recover for negligence against a defendant, a plaintiff must establish four 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. These elements were presented to participants following the 
reading of the case study. Afterwards, the following question was adapted from Wilson (2015b) and 
presented to participants to gain their understanding of the firm’s negligence: “Was Smith & Adams, 
CPAs, negligent in the performance of the audit for Atlantis?” 
 
RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis One Test 
Hypothesis 1 examines whether strong jurors perceive auditors independence, objectivity and 
negligence more favourably than weak identifiers when auditors perform audit and ATS for an audit 
client. The results indicate that jurors’ identification with auditors is significantly associated with jurors’ 
perceptions of firm independence, but in an unexpected direction (p = 0.032). Similarly, the relationship 
between juror identification and objectivity is marginally significant (p = 0.053), but in an unexpected 
direction. However, juror identification is significantly associated with jurors’ negligent verdict in the 
expected direction (p = 0.000). The finding that strong identifiers perceive auditors to be less negligent 
despite unexpectedly lower ratings for independence and objectivity appear to indicate that jurors are 
empathetic towards auditors, even in the midst of properly interpreting the current independence 
standards. Hypothesis 1 partially is supported (Table 2, Panel B).  
 
Hypothesis Two Test 
 
Independence and Objectivity 
A preliminary analysis finds that jurors’ identification with auditors is statistically significant in 
explaining their perceptions of independence (p = 0.036, Table 3, Panel B) and marginally significant in 
explaining their perceptions of objectivity (p = 0.065, Table 4, Panel B).5 Although not statistically 
significant, the interaction between juror identification and firm expertise is practically significant, as it 
closely approaches marginal significance at p = 0.10 (independence, p = 0.106; Table 3, Panel B; 
objectivity, p = 0.101; Table 4, Panel B). 
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TABLE 2 
THE IMPACT OF THE STRENGTH OF JURORS’ IDENTIFICATION WITH AUDITORS 
ON THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, OBJECTIVITY AND 
NEGLIGENCE 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Strength of Juror Identification with Auditors  
Jurors’ Perceptions Weak Identifier Strong Identifier Total 
Auditor Independence 
(Appearance) 
6.8511 
(3.21667) 
n = 47 
5.2927 
(3.48026) 
n = 41 
6.1250 
(3.41334) 
n = 88 
Auditor Objectivity 
7.1957 
(2.50883) 
n = 46 
5.9268 
(3.48131) 
n = 41 
6.5977 
(3.05553) 
n = 87 
Juror Negligence Verdict 
7.7609 
(2.45117) 
n = 46 
5.3171 
(3.48166) 
n = 41 
6.6092 
(3.20739) 
n = 87 
 
Panel B: GLM Analysis of Variance 
Variables Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Auditor Independence 
(Appearance) 
53.180 1 53.180 4.762 **0.032 
960.445 86 11.168  
1013.625 87   
      
Auditor Objectivity 34.900 1 34.900 3.863 ***0.053 
768.020 85 9.036  
802.920 86   
      
Juror  
Negligence Verdict 
129.465 1 129.465 14.571 *0.000 
755.248 85 8.885   
884.713 86    
 *p < 0.01, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.10      
Participants provided a dichotomous response (no / yes) along with a five-point confidence-in-answer 
scale, anchored at 1 = “not confident at all” and 5 = “completely confident.” These responses were 
combined to create a 10-point scale, anchored at 1 = “completely not independent/objective/negligent.” 
and 10 = “completely independent/objective/negligent.” The questions to which they responded are as 
follows: 
Independence: “Smith & Adams, CPAs would have a conflict of interest during the audit if they were to 
provide the client with tax advice that would legally help the client lower their income taxes.” 
Objectivity: “Smith & Adams’ audit team was not objective when auditing Western.”  
Negligence: “Was Smith & Adams, CPAs, negligent in the performance of the audit for Atlantis?” 
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TABLE 3 
THE IMPACT OF THE STRENGTH OF JURORS’ IDENTIFICATION WITH AUDITORS ON 
THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR FIRM’S INDEPENDENCE 
   
Panel A: Descriptive Data   
 Level of Industry Expertise  
Strength of Auditor Identification High Expertise Low Expertise Total 
Weak Identifier 
7.5833 
(3.02046) 
n = 24 
6.0870 
(3.30169) 
n = 23 
6.8511 
(3.21666) 
n = 47 
Strong Identifier 
4.9091 
(3.55781) 
n = 22 
5.7368 
(3.42932) 
n = 19 
5.2927 
(3.48026) 
n = 41 
Total 
6.3043 
(3.52054) 
n = 46 
5.9286 
(3.32318) 
n = 42 
6.1250 
(3.41334) 
n = 88 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Test 
Dependent Variable:   Jurors’ Perceptions of Firm Independence   
 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model 86.463 3 28.821 2.611 0.057 
Intercept 3226.957 1 3226.957 292.359 0.000 
Juror Identification 49.919 1 49.919 4.523 **0.036 
Industry Expertise 2.440 1 2.440 .221 0.639 
Juror Identification x Expertise 29.480 1 29.480 2.671 0.106 
Error 927.162 84 11.038   
Total 4315.000 88    
Corrected Total  1013.625 87    
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
Participants were asked the following question to obtain their perceptions of auditor independence: 
“Smith & Adams, CPAs would have a conflict of interest during the audit if they were to provide the 
client with tax advice that would legally help the client lower their income taxes.” 
 
Participants provided a dichotomous response (no / yes) along with a five-point confidence-in-answer 
scale, anchored at 1 = “not confident at all” and 5 = “completely confident.” These responses were 
combined to create a 10-point scale, anchored at 1 = “completely not independent” and 10 = 
“completely independent.” 
 
In isolation, the expertise variable is not significant in explaining jurors’ perceptions of independence 
(p = 0.639, Table 3, Panel B) and objectivity (p = 0.594, Table 4, Panel B). It would be expected, 
however, that strong identifiers would likely perceive expert auditors to be more independent than 
auditors with lesser expertise. This expectation is rooted in Bamber and Iyer’s (2007) findings that more 
experienced auditors are less likely to acquiesce to client pressure. Accordingly, consistent with the Social 
Identity Theory, it would be expected that strong identifiers would be more lenient towards high expert 
firms in order to protect their own image unless they deem the transgression to be grossly egregious. 
However, the direction of the expertise variable in both analyses is contrary to expectations. 
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TABLE 4 
THE IMPACT OF THE STRENGTH OF JURORS’ IDENTIFICATION WITH AUDITORS ON 
THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR OBJECTIVITY 
   
Panel A: Descriptive Data   
 Level of Industry Expertise  
Strength of Auditor Identification High Expertise Low Expertise Total 
Weak Identifier 7.5417 
(2.26465) 
n = 24 
6.8182 
(2.75398) 
n = 22 
7.1957 
(2.50883) 
n = 46 
Strong Identifier 5.2727 
(3.34068) 
n = 22 
6.6842 
(3.57542) 
n = 19 
5.9268 
(3.48131) 
n = 41 
Total 6.4565 
(3.02366) 
n = 46 
6.7561 
(3.12074) 
n = 41 
6.5977 
(3.05553) 
n = 87 
    
Panel B: Multivariate Test 
Dependent Variable:   Jurors’ Perceptions of Auditor Objectivity   
 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model 61.220 3 20.407 2.284 0.085 
Intercept 3739.448 1 3739.448 418.463 0.000 
Juror Identification 31.176 1 31.176 3.489 ***0.065 
Treatment 2.556 1 2.556 .286 0.594 
Juror Identification x Expertise 24.611 1 24.611 2.754 0.101 
Error 741.700 83 8.936   
Total 4590.000 87    
Corrected Total 802.920 86    
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.10 
 
Participants were asked the following question to obtain their perceptions of auditor objectivity: “Smith & 
Adams’ audit team was not objective when auditing Western.”  
 
Participants provided a dichotomous response (no / yes) along with a five-point confidence-in-answer 
scale, anchored at 1 = “not confident at all” and 5 = “completely confident.” These responses were 
combined to create a 10-point scale, anchored at 1 = “completely not objective” and 10 = “completely 
objective.” 
 
Negligence 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether juror identification will significantly impact jurors’ perceptions of 
auditor negligence when auditing and providing ATS to the client across varying levels of industry expertise.6 
The results are similar to those in the independence and objectivity analysis. The fundamental difference, 
however, is that the interaction term is significant in explaining perceptions of auditor negligence (p = 
0.001, Table 5, Panel B). An untabulated general linear model regression analysis finds that the parameter 
estimate of the interaction term is negative, which suggest that lower negligence verdicts may occur 
amongst strong identifiers, but that is dependent on the auditor’s level of expertise.7  From an academic 
perspective, the significant interaction term supports research which suggests that strong group identities 
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may result in more positive views of the group (Ingriselli, 2015; Haslam and Ellemers, 2005). Hypothesis 
2 is supported. 
 
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Concerns have been presented which question lay jurors’ management of auditor negligence cases, 
with some auditors feeling more comfortable settling these cases prior to trial, at times to their 
disadvantage (Cook et al., 1992). Prior to this study, no empirical evidence existed which examined 
whether strength of jurors’ identification with auditors influences their negligence verdicts in auditor 
litigation cases. The present study draws on SIT to investigate this phenomenon to investigate auditors’ 
independence, objectivity and negligence when an accounting firm audits and provides ATS to their 
clients. This theory was also employed to examine whether the difference in auditor negligence verdicts 
due to jurors’ identification with auditors depends on the firm’s expertise, since Bamber and Iyer (2007) 
suggests that an auditor’s expertise reduces the likelihood that the auditor will acquiesce to client 
demands. 
The central finding of this study is that the strength of jurors’ social identities alone influences their 
perceptions of auditor negligence. When an additional variable (industry expertise) is considered, it is the 
interaction between these two variables that was significant in explaining their auditor negligence 
verdicts. On one hand, the practical significance of these results is that auditors, who in the past have 
doubted whether lay jurors would empathize with auditors (Reffett et al., 2012), now have reason to 
believe that this is not a universal occurrence. On the other hand, these results may prompt the legal 
environment to provide additional screening procedures to ensure that a fair mix of jurors are employed to 
provide an unbiased estimate of juror negligence in auditor litigation cases. 
While these findings are instrumental in filling the void in the academic literature, must be interpreted 
by accounting practitioners within the limitations of the study. One, collection of jurors’ social identities 
in this study was orchestrated using Mael and Ashforth’s Organizational Identification Scale. The 
development of other measures to understand jurors’ social identities, such as adopting Bauer’s (2015) 
instrument to ascertain the strength of jurors’ social identities, will add to the understanding of how this 
influences their negligence verdicts. Two, SIT theory is only one theory which seeks to predict jurors’ 
responses. Outside of a handful of studies that specifically investigate juror bias (Reffett et al., 2015; 
Peecher and Piercey, 2008; Lowe and Reckers, 2006; Kadous, 2001), research on this matter is scant. 
Future research may investigate how other psychology and social science theories may be employed to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of juror biases in auditor negligence cases. 
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TABLE 5 
THE IMPACT OF THE STRENGTH OF JURORS’ IDENTIFICATION WITH AUDITORS 
ON THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR NEGLIGENCE 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Data 
Strength of Auditor Identification 
Level of Industry Expertise  
High Expertise Low Expertise Total 
Weak Identifier 
8.8333 
(0.91683) 
n = 24 
6.5909 
(3.03408) 
n = 22 
7.7609 
(2.45117) 
n = 46 
Strong Identifier 
4.3636 
(3.2300) 
n = 22 
6.4211 
(3.51688) 
n = 19 
5.3171 
3.48166 
n = 41 
Total 
6.6957 
(3.2240) 
n = 46 
6.5122 
(3.22585) 
n = 41 
6.6092 
(3.20739) 
n = 87 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Test 
Dependent Variable:   Jurors’ Perceptions of Auditor Negligence   
 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model 230.339 3 76.780 9.739 0.000 
Intercept 3708.860 1 3708.860 470.427 0.000 
Juror Identification 116.224 1 116.224 14.742 *0.000 
Treatment .185 1 .185 .023 0.879 
Juror Identification x Expertise 99.827 1 99.827 12.662 *0.001 
Error 654.374 83 7.884   
Total 4685.000 87    
Corrected Total 884.713 86    
*p < 0.01 
Participants were asked the following question to obtain their perceptions of auditor negligence: 
“Was Smith & Adams, CPAs, negligent in the performance of the audit for Atlantis?”  
Participants provided a dichotomous response (no / yes) along with a five-point confidence-in-answer 
scale, anchored at 1 = “not confident at all” and 5 = “completely confident.” These responses were 
combined to create a 10-point scale, anchored at 1 = “completely not negligent” and 10 = 
“completely negligent. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Reffett et al. (2012) and Kadous (2000) defended the use of undergraduate students as a proxy for jurors. 
2. Non-experimental research surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) suggests that the 
joint provision of audit and nonaudit services impairs independence (Lowe et al., 1999; Raghunandan, 
2003; Krishnan et al., 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). 
3. The PCAOB defines an aggressive tax position as one that is undertaken for the purpose of tax avoidance 
unless the position is “more likely than not” to be allowed under the current tax laws (SEC 2006).   
4. In order to maintain compliance with the Institutional Review Board, participants were provided with an 
informed consent form that (1) communicated to them the general nature of the research prior to beginning 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230519 
58 Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol. 18(3) 2018 
the experiment, (2) to guaranteed anonymity to the participants and (3) informed participants of their rights 
to opt out of the study. 
5. These results were primarily driven by strong identifiers’ perceptions of expert firms. 
6. To test for demand effects, ANOVA was performed to investigate whether interaction occurred where an 
effect was not predicted. Test were examined to find whether the effect of weak versus strong identifiers on 
negligence perceptions were significant in one level of expertise but not the other. The analysis reveals that 
a significant difference exists between weak versus strong identifiers in the industry expertise condition (p 
= 0.000) but not in the non-expert condition (p = 0.869). This statistical analysis satisfies the study’s goal 
of creating an independent variable in which demand effects do not exist (or were minimal, at best). 
7. The parameter estimates for the treatment, juror identification and interaction variables are 2.057, 4.470, 
and negative 4.300, respectively. 
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